INTRODUCTION
Children's rights advocates and scholars alike continue to call for the development of innovative and alternative rights models, which specifically provide for an expansive conceptualization of children's rights. 2 Central to their calls for reform is a simultaneous recognition that children's rights must embody agency-a child's voice (a proxy for autonomy)-free from govern mental interference, as well as the establishment of certain fundamental "needs" that the State has an affirmative obligation to ensure the child has, and when necessary, affirmatively provide. Informed by medicine, develop mental psychology, social work, and neuroscience, 3 such needs are com the juvenile justice framework, 12 and adoption and parental termination proceedings. 13 Yet, children in U.S. immigration law are still most often seen as illegal migrants and "the law enforcement approach toward [these] migrants [is] [to] prioritize[] their 'alien' status over their status as children." 14 With a few notable exceptions, immigration law has been stagnant to adopt dy namic models that incorporate rights models that are informed by the devel opmental needs of children. Indeed, " [d] ebates about the nature of children's rights have largely bypassed immigration law." 15 This Article contributes to the much-needed discourse about how chil dren's rights should be understood and realized in immigration law. Specifi cally, the incorporation of a needs-based rights model, informed by international human rights law, would provide a scaffold through which to critically assess how the existing procedural framework and avenues for sub stantive immigration relief fail to protect children-as children. Ultimately, this Article recommends structural changes to the immigration system that acknowledge migrant children as independent rights holders-distinct from other adults-eligible to apply for immigration relief in their own right, while simultaneously recognizing the need to protect children with child centered procedures and expertise.
Part I of the Article provides a history of the "child saving movement," which advocated for an active role of the State in protecting children from grave harms such as child abuse, neglect, and child labor. To this end, the State, as parens patriae, must be vigilant to determine what are the "best interests" of the child; yet, this determination is devoid of any consideration of the child's wants or desires.
Part II summarizes and critiques both the traditional rights theory, which fails to recognize rights for children due to a belief that they are not autonomous, as well as the child liberationist theory, which is insensitive to child-centered needs that must be protected. Both of these models are inade quate because they fail to fully appreciate that the rights accorded to a child must integrate a child's complex developmental needs.
Part III describes how human rights law situates rights as trans-sover eign. Humans do not possess rights simply because they are citizens of a state, nor do they possess them because they are rational agents bound by a 12 Cynthia Conward, The Juvenile Justice System: Not Necessarily in the Best Interests of Children, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 39, 70-80 (1998) (advancing alternative measures to the juvenile justice system that encompass prevention, rehabilitation, appropriate punishment as well as provide for the best interest of the child as a priority). 13 Rights for Immigrant Children social contract with a sovereign; the rights humans enjoy flow from their mere existence-rights are inherent to being human. Human rights law rec ognizes this position and accordingly extends rights to children. The wide acceptance of this needs-based rights model is perhaps best illustrated by the creation and rapid international acceptance of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the first comprehensive and international framework for children's rights. This seminal human rights treaty locates the child as the principal agent, who as a rights holder is guaranteed not only protection from governmental interference, but also demands that children are be stowed explicit positive rights. Part IV explores the existing gaps in immigration law-substantively and procedurally-that serve as roadblocks to providing the necessary child centered approach, which includes the congressional and executive branch responses to the recent surge of unaccompanied minors who seek safe haven in the United States from violence in their homes across Central America. This crisis illuminates the fundamental structural gaps in our immigration system that prevent treating children as rights bearers in need of distinct safeguards.
Part V concludes that, in order to adequately protect immigrant chil dren, our immigration system must adopt a needs-based rights model that conceptualizes children, separate and apart from adults, as unique rights holders with exceptional needs. Specifically, significant changes must be made to our immigration system, including the formation of a statutory fed eral "best interest of the child standard" that is informed by the CRC and unconditionally applied to children seeking immigration relief. Furthermore, the guiding principles of the CRC, which serve as a framework for a needs based rights model, must be operationalized through a congressionally cre ated interagency "Child Protection Corps" in all future U.S. government responses, approaches, guidelines, and forms of international relief and pro tection to immigrant children.
I. THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw AND ITs CR1T1cs
This section of the Article examines the ancient conceptions of children as private property subject to the whims of their father, and also traces the historical evolution of realizing children as individuals that are inherently worthy in their own right and deserving of a basic level of protection. This realization permits the state to intervene and usurp parental prerogatives when necessary to protect a child from harm. This section also summarizes the emergence of the best interest of the child standard in Anglo-American law and concludes with critiques of the standard as it applies in family law.
Until the nineteenth century, children were considered the property of their father, who was afforded near absolute rights over his children. 16 Under Athenian law, children could be sold into slavery or simply abandoned; there was simply no obligation, legal or otherwise, to either protect a child or provide for a child's unmet needs.'7 Likewise, under the Roman law "doc trine" of paterfamilias, children owed their father their labor and any in come they earned while living in his household. 18 Moreover, a father was free to discipline children as he saw fit, including the use of corporal punishment. 19 Although during the early part of the medieval period there was a simi lar "absence of interest in children," parents appeared to develop a "new preoccupation with the experiences of childhood" and in nurturing their children into adulthood beginning in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 20 Throughout the Middle Ages, consistent with the feudalistic structure of au thority based on status and hierarchy, children were often relegated to "duty and obedience" under their parents' authority. 21 Political and social reforms, which began in sixteenth-century England and continued into the American colonies, shifted the notion of authority from status to consent. 22 However, despite even these reforms, children were still viewed as immature and be lieved to lack the necessary capabilities to intelligently consent. 23 Therefore, at that time, "childhood became a distinct legal status because [they] were perceived as lacking the ability to form their own judgments." 24 This view of children prevailed into the beginning of the nineteenth century, where the Progressive Era Reformers spurred a "child saving" movement, which ultimately gave the government a "paternal presence in 16 LeAnn Larson Lafave, Origins and Evolution of the "Best Interests of the Child" Stan dard, 34 S.D. L. REv. 459, 464-70 (1989) (providing an overview of the historical develop ment of children's rights). Professor Lafave describes how under the Roman Empire a "child was simply the property of the father; a Roman father could sell his own child into slavery or even put his child to death." Id. at 464-65. The English Common Law gave all powers to the father, and the mother, in contrast, "was entitled to no power [over her children], but to reverence and respect." Id. (citing l WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453). 17 Stephen R. Amott, Autonomy, Standing, and Children's Rights, 33 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 807, 809 (2007) . Athenian children born out of wedlock were not even considered "citi zens." Id. 18 Under the Roman law of paterfamilias, a man's wife and children were chattels belong ing to him, along with slaves and other personal property. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. Ri:.v. 663, 664 ( 1923) . A Roman father even had the legal right to kill his child. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, Tmrr, PROBLEMS 491 (2d ed. 1991). 19 See Hon. Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 983, 986-87 (1996) . 20 Amott, supra note 17, at 811-12. 21 See id. Amott further posits that this notion of a child's duty of obedience, without "corresponding rights," has persisted throughout history and into the American legal system.
Id. He also notes that "notions of duty and obedience" did not distinguish between adults and children; the structure was based solely on status, which explains why some children in post Reformation England held such great power. Id. 22 Id. at 812. 23 Id. i• Id. Spring 2015 Rights for Immigrant Children children's lives." 25 Children, who were still considered incapable of making decisions for themselves, were seen as dependent upon adults. 26 Under this movement, acting in its capacity as parens patriae, the State necessarily interfered with the family structure and decisions when the par ents' actions threatened the child's well-being. 27 "But state authority [did] not lead to children having rights of their own." 28 Initiatives to protect chil dren included compulsory education and restrictions on child Iabor. 29 Most notably, "[t]he juvenile court under challenge in In re Gault was itself a product of Progressive Era reforms." 30 These reformers sought to protect children's innocence by shielding them from their own impressionability. 31 This movement was responsible for the invention of "adolescence," which resulted in the expansion of childhood. 32 It was during this time in Anglo-American family law that the "best interest of the child standard emerged as the prevailing substantive legal principle in determining the fate of children." 33 Under this new standard state courts and quasi-judicial tribunals were ordered to employ the best in terest standard when making a placement decision for a child in adoption, fostering, guardianship, and even matrimonial proceedings. 34 In 1973, Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 35 articulated a psychoanalytic theory to encompass "all legislative, judicial, and executive decisions generally or specifically concerned with establishing, administering, or re-arranging child-parent relationships." 36 They advocated for: three component guidelines for decision-makers concerned with determining the placement and the process of placement of a child in a family or alternative setting. These guidelines rest on the be lief that children whose placement becomes the subject of contro versy should be provided with an opportunity to be placed with adults who are or are likely to become their psychological parents. 37 In making placement decisions an adjudicator must (1) "safeguard the child's need for continuity of relationships"; 38 (2) "reflect the child's, not the adult's, sense of time"; 39 and (3) "must take into account the law's incapacity to supervise interpersonal relationships and the limits of knowledge to make long-range predictions." 40 Overall, these authors argued that "the law's pre sumption that the child's parents are best suited to represent and safeguard his interests should not prevail." 41 Currently, the fifty states 42 and the District of Columbia 43 have statutes that recognize that the best interests of the child must be a consideration in determining what services, actions, and orders will best serve a child, as well as who is best suited to take care of a child. While there is no singular definition of best interests of the child, some commonly accepted principles in assessing the best interests of a child have developed over time, including incorporating the child's voice, as well as prioritizing safety, permanency, and the well-being of every individual child. 44 Yet, even today the substan tive differences among the states are striking. For example, as of 2012 37 Id. at 31. 38 Id. 39 Id. at 40. 40 Id. at 49. 41 BREEN, supra note 34, at 50 n. I 08. District of Columbia enumerate specific criteria  the courts should consider when making a best interest determination; whereas, the other twenty-nine states' statutes only provide general guidance and permit vastly more discretion to a court making the best interests deter minations.45 Moreover, several states and the District of Columbia expressly require courts to consider the child's wishes, taking into account the child's age and maturity to express a reasonable preference, when making this determination. 4 6 The overall lack of consistency, coupled with broad judicial discretion as evidenced by variance among the states, has resulted in resounding criti cisms from the courts 47 and scholars 48 alike that the best interest of the child standard "is a vague, subjective, and malleable principle." 49 The strongest critics are troubled by the standard's apparent indeterminacy. 50 Professor Robert Mnookin asserts that what is "best" or "least detrimental" for any individual child is both speculative and indeterminate; and even if this model could produce predictions, there is no societal consensus on what is "best" or "least detrimental." 51 Instead of using a balancing test borne out of the best interest of the child standard,5 2 Mnookin argues that a more rule-like ing that the best interests of the child principle used in state child welfare proceedings should be applied to accompanied children in immigration proceedings). 45 and implementing what is in the best interest of the child)}. There is considerable literature on problems with applying the best interest standard in state custody disputes between parents. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 16, at 514-27 (arguing for substantive and procedural modifications to the best interest of the child standard to better define the standard for adjudicators and parties involved in custody disputes); Andrea Charlow,Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 267, 269 (1987) (criticizing the best interest standard as a "euphemism for unbridled judicial discre tion"); PHYLLIS CHr;sLuR, MOTHERS ON ThlAL: THE BATl'LE roR CHILDREN AND CusTODY 66 (1986) (finding in a study of sixty mothers who had been custodially challenged between 1960-1981, that 70% of her sample, which she described as "good enough" mothers, lost custody; and 83% of the fathers had not been involved in the primary care of their children, 62% of the fathers had physically abused their wives, and 37% of the fathers had kidnapped their children). 50 structure in making these types of determinations for children is preferable. 53 Expounding on Mnookin' s criticism of the best interest of the child standard, Jon Elster argues that, in addition to the standard being indeterminate and ignoring the rights of parents, it is also vulnerable to being subjugated to larger public policy considerations including preserving societal values re garding who is a legitimate parent. 54 Consistent with these criticisms, in her recent article, Children's Rights as Relational Rights: A Case for Relocation, Professor Ruth Zafran advances an ontological critique of the best interest of the child standard for failing to incorporate a child's agency and status as a rights holder, and concludes that:
twenty-one states and the
[T]he principle of the best interests of the child suffers from being a paternalistic (or, more precisely, parentalistic) criterion, formu lated by the parent or by the state standing in the parent's shoes. In that sense, there is a substantive conceptual difference between the principle of the best interests of the child-which reflects the un derstanding of the "responsible adult" who determines for the child where her best interests lie-and a decision grounded in the rights of the child. The latter is supposed to reflect the will of the child herself (when it can be ascertained) and her rights, just like any decision reached with respect to any individual. In that sense, the deep (or "true") interest of the child is to be treated as a right bearer; adopting a best interest standard therefore is inconsistent with the child's fundamental interest. 55 Overall, the child saving movement challenged the earlier notions of families as purely private relationships that are immune from governmental interference. This movement reformed the law to provide additional legal grounds for state intervention into "domestic" affairs when the state deter mined such interference was in the best interest of the child. Yet, the best interests standard, entrenched in paternalistic notions of a child's need for state protection, in addition to assisting children, served as a cloak to ad vance the state's prerogatives and values, while at the same time trumping private morals, all in the name of protecting a child's best interests. 53 Id. 54 Elster cites the example of a lesbian mother losing custody of her child in Great Britain because of her sexual orientation to illustrate circumstances in which a court knowingly and deliberately refuses to apply the best interest of the child standard because other public policy considerations trump. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. I, 26 (1987) . In summarizing the decision, Elster concludes that the argu ment of the court was essentially: "the risk of the children, at critical ages, being exposed or introduced to ways of life which, as this case illustrates, may lead to severance from normal society, to psychological stresses and unhappiness and possibly to physical experience which may scar them for life." Id. at 27. 55 Zafran, supra note 2, at 179.
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II. TRADITIONAL AND LIBERATIONIST RIGHTS MODELS

AS APPLIED TO CHILDREN
If the Anglo-American best interest of the child standard truly falls short for children, as Zafran claims, are rights theories the correct solution? This section of the Article explores how certain rights models have treated children throughout history. Specifically, this section provides an overview of both the traditional rights model and the liberationist rights model as ap plied to children. The aim of this section is to illustrate why traditional rights theories, which often implicate negative rights, are insufficient models for children because they ultimately depend on the mistaken assumption that autonomy is a precondition for rights. 56 Moreover, this section also high lights the pitfalls of the child liberationist theory as an appropriate model for children due to the fact that it does not take into consideration the difference in the capacity a child has to advocate for his or her rights 57 and what child specific needs or child rights exist. 58 Consequently, both the traditional rights model and the child liberationist theory disappoint because they fail to pro vide a workable framework to protect children's basic needs without limiting their voice. However, while this section concludes that a rights discourse can be limiting, there is no doubt that it can be instrumental both politically in changing realities,5 9 as well as in promoting a non-paternalistic, child-cen tered framework that structurally empowers children. 60
A. Traditional Rights Models Exclude Children as Right-Holders
The traditional rights model is anchored in contemporary liberalism in formed by the works of Thomas Hobbes, Benedict Spinoza, and John Locke, whose writings embodied a modern individualist outlook. 61 Reacting to the tyrannical and arbitrary use of state power against the individual that was often manifested by religious and political intolerance and persecution, these political philosophers "sought to articulate a framework for a society in which all citizens could be free from the fear, injustice, suffering and socio political turmoil produced by capricious judgments and punishments justi 56 59 MrNow, supra note 56, at 307. 60 "The language of rights helps people to articulate standards for judging conduct without pretending to have found the ultimate and unalterable truth ... children no less than adults can participate in the legal conversation that uses rights to gain the community's attention." Id. at 308. 61 fied and enforced via the whimsical use of state power-they sought to provide the foundation for a stable and just society." 62 While there are varia tions of liberalism, 63 the values and beliefs most commonly associated with this political philosophy include: the importance of the individual; the belief in individual equality and individual rights; the right to be free from govern ment intrusion through a limited constitutional government; the importance of private property; and lastly, autonomy. 64 Building upon the work of class ical liberalists, which was largely centered on the relationship between pro tection and self-preservation, John Stuart Mill transformed the focus into modern liberalism's struggle for "the fundamental connection between pro tecting individual liberty and property and securing the conditions under which all individuals might be able to realize their full potential ...." 65 Following from Locke's view, the "traditional rights model" premise is that individuals are rational and autonomous by nature and that the ultimate func tion of law is to accord an individual's dignity. 66 Therefore, the government should respect individual choice, because as a rational agent, a person can choose his or her own conception of the good 67 as it relates to morality, religion, occupation, or life's purposes. 68 Critical to both modern liberal theory and the traditional rights model is the notion of consent. Individuals are capable of making rational choices about morality, religion, and occupation. This autonomy in decision making is the predicate to both possessing and protecting the fundamental rights of a free society, including the right to vote, as well as freedom of speech, associ ation and religion, and personal liberty. 69 Undeniably, the primary purpose of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights is to shield individuals from govern mental interference and provide equal liberty for autonomous choice. 70 As 62 Id. at 26. 63 JoHN GRAY, LmERALISM xi (2d ed. 1995) ("[W]hereas liberalism has no single, un changing nature or essence, it has a set of distinctive features which exhibits its modernity and at the same time marks it off from other modem intellectual traditions and their associated political movements."). 64 YouNG, supra note 61, at 26. 65 Id. at 28. 66 John Rawls' theory of justice as fairness argues that the following "principles of jus tice" will emerge: "a. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society." JoHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBER ALISM 291 (1993). 67 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 407-16 (1971). 68 Id. at 1987-98. 69 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 876 n.2 ("Au tonomy has been identified as a value underlying the constitutional protection of privacy, pro cedural due process, equal protection, and free exercise rights."). 70 RAwL.S, supra note 67, at 28. Spring 2015 Rights for Immigrant Children such, the traditional rights model only recognizes negative rights-specifi cally, freedom from intrusion. 71 Nonetheless, the liberal model acknowledges exceptions to personal au tonomy, most notably, where the State must interfere with one person's choices in order to protect the liberties and autonomy of another individual. 72 Moreover, liberal scholars also recognize that certain individuals have innate qualities that may justify affirmative state action as an exception to the pre sumption of freedom of choice with no government interference. 73 For exam ple, in the traditional rights/choice theory model, children cannot be rights holders because they are not autonomous; rather, as Mill explains, they need the protection of the State:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculty. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. 74
Under the principles of both liberal and traditional rights models, the U.S. Supreme Court has been unwilling to permit state intervention against another individual to protect a child-regardless of incongruous results because children are devoid of rights, therefore rendering them incompetent and unable to make rational decisions. 75 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (holding that state aid to impoverished children, in cluding providing the requisite nutrition for bare survival, is a mere legislative prerogative and not a constitutional right).
Court sees children as miniature adults, which are suddenly capable of ra tional decision making, that it seemingly locates independent rights of a child. 77 For example, in In re Gault the Court held that when a child is to be sentenced like an adult, then that child should have the same procedural due process protections of an adults facing criminal prosecution. 78 These rights include the right to government-funded counsel, the right against self-in crimination, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to timely notifica tion of charges. 79 The Supreme Court found that the Arizona State legislature's establishment of state juvenile delinquency procedures, while it may well have intended to provide special protections for immature offend ers,80 had in fact functioned oppressively so much so that the Gault child was exposed to punishment significantly harsher than adults faced with similar infractions. 81 Certainly, children are accorded rights only to the extent it helps pre pare them "for the autonomous individuality of adulthood." 82 In Plyler v. Doe, 83 the Supreme Court posited that the state provision of education, in cluding the education of non-citizen children with or without valid immigra tion status, was not merely a legislative prerogative, but a necessary state action in a democratic society and a means for children to achieve gainful employment as adults. 84 While education itself is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, either explicitly or implicitly, 85 the Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that "[i]n sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the signifi cant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests." 86 77 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that older children in school have the same constitutional right to free speech that adults do); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles in delinquency proceedings have the same constitutional rights to due process as adults facing criminal prosecution). 78 387 U.S. at 78. 79 Id. 80 Id. at IS. 81 Id. at 29. An alternative reason for the Court's concern over the process accorded to juveniles is not rooted in protecting the autonomy of a child, but rather in protecting the vul nerability of a child and the need to protect the child from state overreaching. See Dailey, supra note 2, at 2130. 82 Fitzgerald, supra note 1I, al 30. 83 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) . 84 Id. at 221. "In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cullUral heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit. ... But more directly, 'education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society."' Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). 85 "Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 35 (1973) . 86 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
In these two cases, the Supreme Court, expounding on the liberal rights theory, required the State to affirmatively provide for children-in Gault it was procedural due process, while in Plyler it was K-12 education for all state residents regardless of immigration status-not because they were themselves individual rights holders, but only because they were conceptual ized as potential adults and potential future rational agents that would be participating in society. s 7
B. The Child Liberationist Movement: Children as a Minority Class in Need of Emancipation
In reaction to both the progressive era reforms-advocating for a pater nalistic model for protecting children-and the traditional rights theorists contending that children are devoid of independent rights as children-the Children's Liberation Movement (led by John Holt, Richard Farson, and others) insisted that children should be seen as a minority group that de serves to have both adult freedom and self-determination rights, similar to other groups who have faced discrimination such as women and African Americans.88 Drawing on the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey, 89 child liberationists argued that children deserve the right to partici pate fully in society and also opined "that children's voices were wrongly absent even from public discussions of children's rights." 90 John Holt argued that children, "of whatever age," are equal and should be treated like adults under the law. 91 Under this premise, children should have the right to vote, work for pay, sign contracts, manage their own educations, travel, and form their own families. 92 87 Fitzgerald, supra note I I, at 31. 88 RICHARD EVANS FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 10 (1974) (drawing parallels with the civil rights movement and women's liberation to children's liberation efforts); see generally JoHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974). 89 Farson, in explaining the roots of the child liberation movement, traces its strong ideo logical commitment to freedom for children to the works of Rousseau and Dewey. See FAR SON, supra note 88, at 9 (citing JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE (Barbara Foxley trans., Dutton 1974) (1762); JoHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938)). 90 Minow, supra note 25, at 271 (citing Helen Baker, Growing Up Unheard, in THE CmL DREN's RIGHTS MOVEMENT: OVERCOMING THE OPPRESSION OF YOUNG PEOPLE 187, 189 (Bea trice Goss & Ronald Goss eds., 1977) (citing two Harvard Educational Law Review issues on children's rights that do not contain any articles by people under the age of eighteen)). 91 HOLT, supra note 88, at 18 (arguing that children should be granted eleven rights in cluding: the right to choose an alternative family framework; the right to information; the right to choose an education framework and self-education (Holt is considered the founder of home schooling in the United States); the right to work and enter into and perform economic transac tions; the right to sexual freedom; the right to vote; the right to be educated in accordance with a child's characteristics; the right to protection against corporal punishment; and the right to justice). 92 Holt recognized that children do depend on others to care for them, feed them, keep them warm and clean, and protect them from harm. 93 Yet, he extolled the example of twin boys, approximately four years old, whose par ents were either killed or taken prisoner during World War II, and managed to survive on their own in the midst of great poverty-" all by themselves." 94 For Holt and other liberationists, humans "outgrow our physical helpless ness and dependency much sooner or faster than most people think." 95 Liberationists were suspicious of the idea of childhood; they believed it was a state construct instrumental in both suppressing and limiting the conduct of a class of individuals. 96 For them, children did not always exist; they were invented. 97 Once society was willing to embrace the concept of childhood, liberationists proffered that the government was only then able to establish a bright-line distinction between childhood and adulthood based on an arbi trary age distinction, and then use that manufactured divide to confer rights to some-adults-and to deny rights to others--children. 98 Moreover, children liberationists were convinced that governmental and parental decision making, rooted in child protection justifications, were in fact a guise to control, segregate, and program children to be obedient, well behaved, and complicit. The system was designed so that children were seen as lacking independent thinking and emotion. 99 Therefore, these libera tionists argued, children, just as adults, are entitled by right to self-determi nation and should "have the right to exercise self-determination in decisions about eating, sleeping, playing, listening, reading, washing, and dressing." 100 Likewise, children liberationists maintained that the family was not necessarily the natural and fundamental unit of society, and that children, like adults, had the right to choose alternative home environments 101 when their parents failed to protect or affirmatively harmed them. Citing child abuse and torture 102 by biological parents as evidence, Farson posited, "while the natural parents of the child do not necessarily make the best parents it is abundantly clear that they make the worst ones." 103 Though children under this theory have a right to leave a horrific family environment and seek an alternative living arrangement, a child has no right to state protection from violence or other maltreatment. For liberationists, 93 Hrn.T, supra note 88. at 23. 94 Id. at 24 95 Id. at 24-25. 96 FARSON, supra note 88, at 17-25. 97 Id. at 17 (arguing that childhood is a European invention of the sixteenth century). 98 HOLT, supra note 88, al 26. 99 FARSON, supra note 88, at 2. 100 Id. at 27. rni Id. at 42. 102 Farson details examples of horrific abuse: "[c]hildren are tied, gagged, whipped, sys tematically exposed to electric shock, made to swallow all kinds of noxious materials such as pepper, dirt, feces, urine, vinegar, alcohol; their skulls and bones have been broken-some times repeatedly-their faces and bodies lacerated, their eyes pounded, even gouged out." Id. at 47. 103 Id. at 47-48. 107 "Admittedly children's rights present a particularly difficult case for rights theorists, mainly due to the children's limited capacities, greater vul nerabilities, and dependency on others."'°8 In Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American law, Professor Martha Minow argues that if rights are only understood as emanating from an autonomous rational male, then rights function to differentiate and effectively silence differ ence_l!l9 Undeniably, Minow argues that law's dilemma is to ameliorate the unfair consequences of the powerless without further reducing their power. 110 So for Minow, and others, if rights, particularly children's rights, can speak to more than just autonomy, there is power in reclaiming the rights rhetoric. In particular, children's rights should include a child's needs, "especially the central need for relationships with adults who are themselves enabled to create settings where children can thrive." 111 Moreover, needs should be placed within the rights talk because "basic needs are not only the justification of having rights; they also identify the nature of many of chil dren's rights." 112 Therefore, the task of reimagining and reclaiming rights as tools of power and protection for children requires constructing a rights framework that embodies positive rights such as participation, education, 104 Id. at 31. 105 GAL, supra note 2, at 17. 106 Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 NOTRG DAME L. REv. 727, 757-58 The child shall in all circumstances be among the first to re ceive protection and relief.
Article III, 1924 Geneva Declaration
After over a decade, a working group established in 1979 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights negotiated and drafted the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 114 This effort ulti mately resulted in 41 substantive articles, including extensive provisions on implementation and monitoring, 115 which were ratified collectively in record time. "[N]o other specialized United Nations human rights treaty has en tered into force so quickly and been ratified by so many states in such a short period of time," 116 making it the most universally adopted human rights charter to date. 117 So far, 194 States have become parties to the treaty. In 1995, the United States signed the CRC; 118 however, despite its pivotal role in drafting the treaty, 119 the United States has not ratified it. The only other UN member countries that have not ratified the treaty are Somalia and South Sudan. 120 Although the U.S. has signed, but not ratified the CRC, it is still "obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the agreement." 121 In addition, non-refoulement is considered to be customary international law or }us cogens. 122 As such, the U.S. is bound by the CRC's non-refoulement obligation. 123 The CRC's central contribution to the rights discourse is its situation of children not in relation to their parents or the State, but as independent rights holders regardless of their lack of autonomy. 124 Thus, the treaty recognizes a State's responsibility to not simply refrain from interference in a child's life, but also to affirmatively realize positive rights-independent of social con tract theory-including right to survival, which includes the right to basic necessities such as health care, social security, and freedom from poverty. 125 This human rights approach, which develops a broader understanding of children's rights, is based on a child's entitlement to dignity, respect, and freedom from arbitrary treatment. 126 The CRC enumerates the interests and needs of children that must be considered by States, including, but not lim ited to, "the three P's:" 127 "provision" (fulfillment of basic needs such as right to food, health care, and education); 128 "protection" (the right to "be shielded from harmful acts or practices" such as commercial or sexual ex ploitation and involvement in warfare); 129 and "participation" (the right "to be heard on decisions affecting one's own life'').' 30 Overall the CRC, "for the first time, acknowledged children as individuals fully entitled to human rights-civil, political, economic, social, and cultural-without neglecting their special needs for protection." 131 The individual articles and responsibilities of the States, pursuant to the CRC, are situated in a framework consisting of four guiding principles: non discrimination; 132 best interest of the child as the primary consideration; 133 right to life, survival, and development; 134 and participation. 135 These princi 122 Alice Farmer, Non-refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-terror Measures that Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. I, 23-28 (reviewing arguments from UNHCR, Lauterpacht, Allian, and others that non-refoulement is customary international law or jus cogens). 123 "If a norm qualifies as jus cogens, that is a peremptory norm of international law, then a persistent objection. reservation, or a 'controlling executive or legislative act or judicial deci sion' does not excuse U.S. violation of that norm." DAvm WEISSBRODT ET Non-discrimination, the first principle under the CRC, requires equal ity; all children should have the same rights-de jure and de facto-regard less of where a child lives, to what minority group a child belongs, whether the child was born in or out of wedlock, whether or not the child has a disability, and whether or not the child is residing in her homeland. 136 This principle does not mean that all children must receive exactly the same re sources, protections, or freedoms; rather, "[t]o achieve substantive equality, a legal system has to be sensitive to the inequalities of children and provide them with the required means to overcome these inequalities as much as possible in order to provide all children equal opportunities." 137 Under the non-discrimination principle, non-national migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers shall be treated equally as native children. 138 This principle requires host countries to adopt policies that enable the full inclusion of those who might be considered different, 139 including immigrants.
Second, the Convention's best interests principle creates a duty for States to conduct an individual assessment of a child's interest and not rely "on general assumptions regarding children in different situations." 140 In fact, "the best interests standard may be regarded as being a general overall theme of the Convention. It appears eight times in the fifty-four-article Con vention, in addition to being one of its governing General Principles. This elevates the standard to being the most important international standard cur rently regulating decisions regarding the child." 141 States are required to weigh this individualized interest against all other competing state interests, such as cost and efficiency, and the child's interest should take precedence over any other considerations. The best interest standard, read in concert with the non-refoulement obligation of the Convention that is discussed at 136 GAL, supra note 2, at 37. 137 Id. ns Id. 139 Martha Minow argues that the way to move beyond the dilemma of difference is not to avoid or notice difference because that undermines equality, but to see difference as relational and work to remake institutions that accommodate difference instead of using difference as a way to exclude individuals. M1Now, supra note 56, at 375-80. 140 GAL, supra note 2, at 39. 141 BREEN, supra note 34, at 78-79 (summarizing how the best interest of the child stan dard was negotiated among the Working Group and Member States and its ultimate articula tion in Article 3 of the Convention). greater length later in this Article, means that the prerogative of a State to exclude non-citizens from crossing its borders cannot take precedence over what is in the best interest of an individual child. In some instances, families may decide that it is not in the best interest of their children to remain in the home, and in other instances families may sell their children for sex or la bor.142 Therefore, the United States cannot summarily deport children seek ing sanctuary without first conducting a case-by-case assessment of each child's best interests 143 and determining whether or not the child would face irreparable harm if returned to his or her country of origin. 144
In addition, the right to life, survival, and development principle neces sarily compels States to protect children from violence. 145 Children exposed to violence, including sexual abuse and exploitation, can suffer serious nega tive short-term and long-term effects to their development. 146 Article 6.2 of the CRC, which reads, "States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child[,]" is closely related to the CRC' s Article I 9 requirement that States provide protection against child abuse. 147 In addition, the Committee on the Rights of the Child regarded the principle of right to life, survival, and development as creating an affirma tive obligation to protect children from violence both in their home and from the society at large. 148 Children fleeing violence should have the ability to seek protection from their country of nationality, and to the extent that coun try is unable to provide protection, the CRC contemplates other states pro viding surrogate state protection. 149
Finally, the right to participation principle requires that, in decisions concerning a child, that child has "more than a right to be heard, but less than a right to independent decision making." 150 The Convention's view is distinct from the aforementioned child liberationists who posit that children, as rational and autonomous agents, should be able to make their own deci sions. Rather, Article I 2 of the Convention recognized for the first time. in a child-focused international instrument that "the views of the child be[] 142 Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization and the Transnational Mi gration of Unaccompanied Children, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. RouNDTADLE 269, 271-73 (2000) . 143 147 GAL, supra note 2, at 41-42. 148 Id. at 42. 149 See CRC, supra note 114, at art. 22.1 (requiring States Parties to provide the appropri ate protection and humanitarian assistance "in the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties."). 150 GAL, supra note 2, at 45.
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child[,]" 151 and that a "child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either di rectly, or through a representative or an appropriate body[.]" 152 This princi ple differs from the child liberationists' claim that children, with rights to self-determination and autonomy, are entitled to make their own decisions without adult consultation. The CRC's principle also distinguishes itself from parens patriae models, which assume children are incapable of expres sing opinions and preferences. Under the CRC's principle, immigrant chil dren's preferences and opinions should be accorded deference in the law and given due weight in relation to their age and maturity . 153
B. The CRC's Key Human Rights Law Obligations: Primacy of Family and Non-Refoulement
First, consistent with international law and similar treaties, the CRC recognizes "the right to respect for family life," specifically, the critical im portance of the family unit to children. 154 With respect to the family unit, the two following key doctrines have been incorporated into various interna tional treaties: (1) that family is the natural and fundamental unit of society, and (2) that maintaining the family unit is in the best interests of the child. 155 In recognition of the family as society's fundamental unit, the CRC pro vides that, "the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particu larly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community." 156 This standard, which is repeated throughout international law, not only recognizes family as a "natural and fundamental unit of society," but also places an affirmative duty on the state to provide for its protection. 157 The CRC also explicitly recognizes that a child's "best interests" are, as far as possible, in the maintenance of the family unit. 158 As previously men tioned, the CRC provides that the "best interest of the child shall be [the] primary consideration" in all actions concerning children. 159 155 Id. at 652. 156 Id. (quoting CRC, supra note 114, at Preamble). 157 Id. at 652-53. 158 See id. at 653-54 (arguing that it can be inferred from certain provisions, such as art. 9.1, which puts "a ban on the separation of a child from his or her parents, except by compe tent authorities subject to judicial review [,] " that the CRC links the "best interest of the child" with the "maintenance of the family unit"). 159 CRC, supra note 114, at art. 3.1. sistent with international law principles, the CRC respects the family unit by giving the child the "right to ... be cared for by his or her parents." 160 Accordingly, as the recognized fundamental unit of society, interna tional law reflects that the family unit is both primarily responsible for and best suited to providing for the needs and care of children. 161 Therefore, ad verse immigration action, "from denial of entry to forced removal to separa tion from a caretaker to detention," against any one individual of the family unit is an interference of these principles. 162 Equally important is the CRC's non-refoulement duty, which "is one of the most expansive definitions in international law." 163 The Committee on the Rights of the Child states that, "in fulfilling obligations under the Con vention, States shall not return a child to a country where there are substan tial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the child." 164 The Committee cites Articles 6 (rights to life and survival) and 37 (rights to liberty and freedom from torture) as instances that would qualify as irreparable harm to a child. 165 The CRC binds States to not only refrain from interfering with the political rights of children, but also requires that States affirmatively protect children from harm perpetrated by other States or private actors. 166 Arguably, for migrant children fleeing irreparable harm from their home countries, there is an affirmative obligation on States to provide protection by not returning the children to their homes. 167 Under the CRC, the non-refoulement of children applies in more instances than it does for adults. 168 "Ultimately, the underlying risk of 'irreparable harm' to indi vidual children is non-negotiable: their interests cannot be traded away." 169 160 See id. at art. 7. I. 161 See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1114-15 (2011) (recognizing that the designation of the "care and upbringing of children," which is implicit in the European National Convention and explicit in German Basic Law, creates "both a right and a duty incumbent on parents"). 162 168 See id. at 45 (arguing that the United Kingdom had an affirmative obligation not to return Afghan children to Afghanistan if "the conditions for children's rights in Afghanistan are sufficiently adverse that there may be a 'real risk of irreparable harm'"). 169 Id. at 48.
IV. CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION LAW DEVOID OF RIGHTS AND NEEDS
With a few notable exceptions, 170 U.S. immigration Jaw fails in its en tirety to recognize immigrants as rights bearers. 171 The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that immigration, and the right to regulate which individuals are allowed to enter the United States, is a power of the sover eign.172 Further, the Court, applying the plenary power doctrine, has refused to overturn or invalidate immigration statutes (including those that discrimi nate on race, national origin, and political opinion), when holding that immi gration is a matter "vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of ... government ... exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." 173 Moreover, the Court has also stated that, "over no other area is the legislative power more 'complete' than immigration." 174 It is the U.S. Congress that enacts Jaws determining who can enter the United States, under what conditions, and for how long. 175 Congress also establishes who can be removed from the United States based on acts committed after en try.176 Such individual immigrants have no legal basis to challenge these de cisions because they have no legal right to remain-entry is a privilege. It is Spring 2015 Rights for Immigrant Children no surprise then that "U.S. immigration law fails to fully recognize children as individuals with independent rights and interests." 177 The next section of the Article first describes how immigration law generally-both in substance and process-fails to treat children as children.
Highlighting two examples, this section argues that not only do U.S. immi gration laws need to be radically transformed, but so do the embedded cul tural attitudes regarding what immigrant children need, how they should be treated, and what rights of theirs must be realized.
A. Children Are Not Property, Wards, or Adults-They Are Persons: Professor David Thronson's Critique
Current treatment of children by immigration law and policy is funda mentally flawed, argues Professor David Thronson, 178 because it treats chil dren both as objects 179 and adults, 180 but not individual rights holders. 181 This dilemma pervades both the substantive immigration relief available to chil dren and the procedure by which such relief is granted. 182 Immigration law processes and treats most non-citizen children as. the derivatives of adults. 183 Under immigration law, status as a child is greatly significant because if the individual is a non-citizen child, he or she can derive the status of a qualifying parent, but only when that parent applies for child is volleyed as an object between parents and the State when parents facing deportation make claims about the harm their children will suffer if they are deported and the reaction of the state child welfare systems to a parent's decision to preserve family unity by potentially placing his or her child in harm's way if deported). · Vol. 18 such relief. 184 In fact, Thronson notes, "[e]mphasizing dependence on par ents as a prerequisite to being a 'child' strongly reflects notions of the child as property." 185 Under the current framework, a child lacks the ability to affirmatively ask for recognition or status on account of a family relation ship; put more simply, they are at the mercy of the qualifying parent. 186 In fact, children are not permitted to petition for others, such as siblings or a parent, even if the child is a U.S. citizen. 187 Equally concerning is the fact that young parents who are under 21 (a child under the INA) have no avenue to pursue immigration relief for their child because "derivative status extends only one generation from the princi pal beneficiary. A young parent who otherwise qualifies as a child cannot immigrate as a derivative without leaving her child behind." 188 In addition, a child's dependence on a parent to apply for status means that the ultimate decision maker will often not consider the child's own independent claim for immigration relief. For example, in the case of refugees, "[a]ccompanied children have tended to be submitted within their family's asylum applica tion; indeed, both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the INS have pointed out that invisibility is a common problem for refugee children." 189 Even when a child's immigration status is aligned with that of 184 In immigration law, if the principal beneficiary has a spouse and child at the time an immigrant benefit is conferred, the beneficiary can petition to have the spouse and child ac quire immigration status as derivatives. 8 U.S.C. § I I 53(d). 185 Thronson, supra note 15, at 992. Immigration law defines a child as an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who falls into one of six categories: (I) "a child born in wedlock"; (2) a stepchild, "provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time of the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred"; (3) "a child legitimated ... if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation"; (4) "a child born out of wedlock, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother or to its natural father if the father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with the person"; (5) "a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years"; or (6) "a child, under the age of sixteen at the time a petition is filed in his behalf ... who is an orphan" and whose adoptive parents have "complied with the preadoption requirements." 8 U.S.C. § l IOl(b)(l)(A)-(F). In addition, if children marry or reach the age of twenty-one, they are categorically not considered "children" under the Immigration and Nationality Act, but rather are defined as "sons" or "daughters." 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(l). 186 Thronson recounts the case of Boguslaw Fornalik to illustrate the dependency the child has on the adult petitioner for immigration status. Fornalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 527-28 (7th Cir. 2000). In this case, seventeen-year-old Boguslaw discovered that his abusive father failed to include him in an immigration petition. This omission resulted in Boguslaw's deporta tion back to Poland and leaving his mother and siblings in the United States. See Thronson, supra note 15, at 994. 187 It is only after the U.S. citizen child turns twenty-one, and is no longer classified as a child but rather an adult under the INA, that he or she could apply for derivative status for parents or siblings. 8 U.S.C. § § 115 l(b)(2)(A)(i) (parents of U.S. citizen adults are classified as immediate relatives and not subject to numerical limitations on allowable visas), 1153(a)(4) (eligibility for brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens for family immigrant based visas). 188 
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Rights for Immigrant Children his or her parents, Thronson notes that, "although this version of family integrity does, in most instances, tend to keep children together with parents, it has no concern for where the family ends up or for children whose parents are unable to or choose not to assist them." 190 In contrast, for children who do not share the same status as their par ents, immigration law automatically treats them as adults. 191 Unaccompanied minors-children without a parent or legal guardian to provide care and physical custodyl 92 -that arrive at the border are only eligible to apply for the same types of immigration relief as an adult. Immigration law does not "tailor substantive or procedural protections to their age or developmenl." 193 Children, like adults, must navigate the complex immigration system and have no right to government-funded or appointed counsel, which means they may be forced to navigate the immigration courts pro se. 1 9 4
While children may in certain instances serve as the principal applicant for immigration relief, including asylum and U and T visas, the only child centered immigration benefit currently available to children in the immigra tion system is Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS).1 95 The Obama ad ministration under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program 196 has decided to defer placing certain individuals who came to the United States as children 197 in removal proceedings and permitted work au thorization for those meeting the requirements of DACA. 198 197 Congress has introduced multiple bills to provide relief to this unauthorized immigrant student population, which has often been entitled the "Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act," or the DREAM Act. Yet, despite various congressional attempts to provide status to this select group of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States, there have been no changes in the law and this group still has no path to permanent status in the United States. See Elisha Barron, Recent Development: The Development, Relief, and Education far Alien Minors (DREAM Act), 48 HARV. J. ON Lnrns. 623, 632-37 (2011) (summarizing the failed attempts to enact various versions of the DREAM Act from 2001-2011). 198 The criteria detailed in the memorandum include: (1) "has continuously resided in the United States for at least five years preceding the date of this memorandum and is present in the United States on the date of this memorandum"; (2) "is currently in school, has graduated from high school, has obtained a general education development certificate, or is honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States"; (3) "has not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise poses a threat to national security or public safety"; (4) "came to the United States under the age of sixteen"; and (5) "is not above the age of thirty." Memo from Janet Napolitano, supra note 196. Vol. 18 does not confer any immigration benefit or put the individual on a path to permanent status in the United States. 199 Granted, asylum is potentially an option for some unaccompanied chil dren to secure immigration relief in the United States; however, adjudicators are skeptical of granting children asylum under novel legal theories like claims of persecution on account of membership in a particular social group, such as children fleeing gang violence or abuse in the home. 200 So while some children are able to gain refugee status through the asylum process, many do not qualify for such relief. 201 For a child to be eligible for SUS, he or she must be present in the United States. Second, the child must be "declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally commit ted to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State ... and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant's parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law." 202 According to DHS regulations, "long term foster care" means "that a determination has been made by the juvenile court that family reunification is no longer a viable option." 203 The juvenile court also must make a finding "that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence." 204 Immigration status is not conferred by the juvenile court; rather, once the juvenile court issues an order with a finding of fact, the child must still apply to DHS for immigration status. 205 DHS adjudicates the application and if there are no grounds of inadmissibility, then the child may be granted SUS status, which confers on him or her legal permanent status to remain in the United States. 206 However, the child is permanently barred from petitioning for his or her non-abusive parent 207 to derive status from the child's SUS status, severing any possibility of family unity. 208 Even with this child-centered immigration visa, which requires the fact finding of child welfare experts, problems with its implementation are com 199 monplace. 209 Namely, DHS "has failed to break free of its dominant modes of thinking about children. The result has been a usurpation of the juvenile court role and the creation of substantial barriers for abused, neglected, and abandoned children seeking immigration relief." 210 Unless and until struc tural changes are made in the immigration system, which will not only trans form the process and relief available to children, but the culture as well, children will continue to be seen as objects or adults in miniature bereft of any rights that safeguard their child-specific needs.
B. A Contemporary Case Study: The Policy Response to Unaccompanied Children at Our Border
The 213 AND GIRLS or-CENTRAL AMrlRtCA I (2012) (noting that unaccompanied minors are subject not only to violent gang attacks, but also face targeting by police who mistakenly assume that they are gang-affiliated; additionally, girls in particular "face gender-based violence, as rape be comes increasingly a tool of control").
der rates mirror that of conflict zones. 215 These countries of origin are inun dated with various human rights violations, which are met with a complete lack of meaningful State protection. 216 Indeed, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees recently concluded that at least 58% of unac companied children arriving from these countries were forcibly displaced and potentially in need of international protection. 217 As the current crisis escalated, many of these children were being housed at emergency shelters in icebox-cold cells-nicknamed hieleras, Spanish for freezers-with no access to food or medical care, 218 while DHS attempted to establish which children may have an available sponsor in the United States to whom they could be released, 219 while concurrently initiat ing removal proceedings against each child without valid immigration status. Under current immigration law, the only protections for these children are discrete and narrow forms of immigration relief. Currently, the most com mon forms of relief for unaccompanied minors are: asylum, 220 special immi grant juvenile status (SIJS), 221 and T and U visas. 222 However, some children may legitimately fear violence or have suffered past harm but do not qualify for these forms of immigration relief. For example, fleeing generalized vio lence perpetrated by armed criminals or gang members, no matter how hor rific, is not grounds for asylum, SUS status, or T or U Visas. 223 ble relief and actively assists the child with the application process. 224 Yet, children are not entitled to government-funded counsel and therefore often must proceed before an immigration judge alone. For other children, there is no available immigration relief; while they have witnessed unspeakable hor rors and have been the victims of violence and abuse, there is simply no legal answer to their calls for help. They are not simply migrants crossing international borders; they are emblematic of an international humanitarian crisis rapidly unfolding in Central America.
In responding to this humanitarian crisis, multiple members of the Obama administration have called for statutory changes to the 2008 Traffick ing Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). 225 In addition, mem bers of Congress have put forth legislation calling for treating Central American children in the same fashion as Mexican children under the TVPRA. 226 Under the TVPRA, there are special rules for children originating from contiguous states (Mexico and Canada), which include a presumption of im mediate return to their home country with no hearing before an immigration judge, unless the child is identified as a victim of severe trafficking, demon strates a credible fear of persecution, or is unable to make independent deci sions about his or her options. 227 A child capable of making decisions and who does not have such fears can be "permitted to withdraw" his or her application for admission and be sent home. 228 The legislation calls for such screening to occur promptly (within 48 hours), but if such screening does not occur within 48 hours then that child is transferred to Health and Human Services. 229 Safe repatriation of children to Mexico is presumably insured by contiguous country agreements and other procedures. 230 Even though the rules for contiguous states found at TVPRA § 235(a) are more permissive of quick return than for non-contiguous states, Congress passed the law in or 224 See FRYDMAN, supra note 212, at 35-37 (discussing the failures of the current system to identify unaccompanied minors that are eligible for forms of relief such as Special Immi grant Juvenile Status, T Visas, and U visas). 225 der to provide more protection for Mexican children than had been the case up to that point. In contrast, under the 2008 trafficking legislation, unaccompanied minors from noncontiguous states are placed in ordinary removal proceed ings-a long-standing immigration enforcement mechanism. Simultane ously, these children are transferred to facilities run by the Office of Refugee Resettlement ("ORR") where they are allowed to meet with social workers and attorneys experienced in working with children. In addition, and pursu ant to the TVPRA, HHS appoints independent child advocates for particu larly vulnerable unaccompanied children in the Rio Grande Valley and Chicago; their role is to meet with the children, learn their stories, and advo cate for their best interests.
These proposed changes by both members of Congress and the Obama administration aptly illustrate the U.S. government's tendency to see children as illegal migrants first and foremost, with little regard for the child's rights and needs. These proposed policies violate children's rights by first, contra vening the Supreme Court's decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, /nc., 231 and second, failing to provide for the children's physical and psycho logical protection needs, which run afoul of the U.S.'s international obliga tions to not return children to a country where "there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the child.'' 232
First, in Sale, the Supreme Court upheld President Reagan's interdiction program, which permitted the U.S. Coast Guard to interdict unauthorized migrants attempting to land in the U.S. on the high seas and return them to their country of origin without any advice about their right to seek protec tion.233 The Supreme Court found that the program did not violate the U.S.'s obligations under the Refugee Convention of non-refoulement-the obliga tion not to return an individual to a country where he or she may face serious harm-because the interdiction occurred on the high seas and not within U.S. territory. 234 So while the interdiction program survived judicial scrutiny, Congress' and the Administration's proposals to fast track the deportation of unaccompanied minors with little, if any, process squarely violate the Court's Sale decision because obligations that do not apply on the high seas do in fact apply at our borders.
Second, summarily deporting unaccompanied minors explicitly fails to incorporate the best interests of the child principle required by international law. 235 Upon arrival, these children are hungry, sleep deprived, and scared. Additionally, they are coming from countries where there is a high degree of 231 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 232 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, supra note 164, ' II 27. 233 509 U.S. 155. 234 Id. at 187-88. 235 See generally Carr, supra note 44; see also International Covenant on Civil and Politi cal Rights an. 24(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to ... national or social origin ... the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the pan of his family, society and the State."). mistrust of government officials. Indeed, they may even be fleeing govern ment persecution. Immediately subjecting these young children to a cursory and arbitrary interview by a law enforcement officer risks children failing to fully articulate why they are afraid or why they cannot return. Swift deporta tion risks that such children will be repatriated to unsafe conditions, includ ing continued physical and sexual abuse, gang recruitment, and other forms of criminal violence. 236
C. Parents Without Status: Severing Family Unity in the Name of the Best Interest of the Child
When a parent's lack of immigration status results in an arrest, his or her child often enters the child welfare system. These children are both in voluntarily taken from their parents and placed in the custody of strangers all in the name of the best interest of the child standard. 237 According to a 2011 report by the Applied Research Center, there were at least 5100 chil dren living in foster care whose parents had either been detained or de ported.238 This report also found that the "research clearly indicates that once children of noncitizens are removed from the custody of their parents, their families are subjected to particular and deep systemic failures to reunifica tion."239 When immigration officials apprehend an undocumented parent, there is often no opportunity for the parent to make arrangements for child 236 Appleseed Foundations of the United States, in a 2011 report evaluating the ability of the current U.S. government screening policy of Mexican children to adequately identify po tential refugees and victims of trafficking, concluded that: "[i]n the United States, TVPRA screening is not conducted either in a manner or in environments likely to elicit information that would indicate whether the minor is a potential victim of trafficking or abuse, and whether the child can and does voluntarily agree to return to Mexico. This failure predictably follows DHS's decision to assign TVPRA screening duties to its law enforcement branch, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a force intended to repel external threats to the United States and, not surprisingly, without any child welfare expertise. The minimal training and tools provided to CBP officers have done little to equip them to satisfy the Congressional mandates of the TVPRA. As a result, the expected post-TVPRA influx of unaccompanied Mexican minors into the U.S. system designed to evaluate their rights to protection has not materialized, leaving many of these children vulnerable to trafficking and other forms of exploitation, including by criminal gangs and drug cartels. care and immigration officials refuse to release parents during the pendency of their immigration proceedings. 240 As a result, parents may be involuntarily separated from their children.
This situation is exacerbated when the immigration status of the parent and the child are not aligned, particularly in circumstances where the parent does not have valid immigration status but the child is a legal permanent resident or U.S. citizen. Cancellation of removaJ2 41 permits an immigration judge to grant lasting relief to a non-citizen parent if the parent has resided in the United States continuously for ten years, possesses good moral char acter, and can prove that his or her removal would result in "exceptional or extremely unusual hardship" to the U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident child. 242 In this situation, the parent usually argues that, in the event he or she was deported, the child would accompany the parent and this would result in exceptional or extremely unusual hardship to the child. Additionally, immi gration law generally presumes that a child and parent will be reunited in the parent's country of origin after deportation. 243 Since a child in such a situa tion would not be required to leave because he or she has a right to remain in the U.S., a parent making these types of arguments inadvertently triggers the intervention of child welfare agencies, who recommend that the child be removed from the family because it is in the child's best interest to remain in the country, regardless of what the parent feels is best for the child. 244 In addition to arguing that U.S. citizen children should not be deported with their parents, but rather should remain in the care and custody of the State, these child welfare agencies also advocated for the termination of the parental rights of non-citizen parents residing in the U.S. simply because the parent does not have valid immigration status and therefore is an unfit par ent.245 For example, in Jn re M.M., a Georgia juvenile court terminated a 2AO Id. 241 Cancellation of removal is a form of discretionary immigration relief that allows an immigration judge: · "[to] cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien (A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been convicted of an offence under section l I 82(a)(2), I 227(a)(2), or l 227(a) (3) of this title [except in a case described in section I 227(a)(7) of this title where the Attor ney General exercises discretion to grant a waiver]; and (D) establishes that the removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien law fully admitted for permanent residence." 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l) (2012 
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Rights for Immigrant Children father's parental rights after finding him unfit because he was an undocu mented immigrant and where there was the "possibility that [he] could someday be deported." 246 In this case, the father was not facing removal by OHS; rather, the mere possibility that deportation could occur was enough to terminate his parental rights. 247 These decisions are both a disturbing trend and run counter to past practices where "[o]nly a handful of courts have published opinions that formally endorse the consideration of immigration status in making custody determinations."2 4 8 A parent's immigrant status should not be dispositive of that parent's ability to care for his or her own child. Additionally, it should not be a factor considered by child welfare experts in parental termination decisions. "Chi 1 dren, as well as parents, have a fundamental, constitutionally protected inter est in the preservation of the parent-child relationship." 249 Conversely, these cases illustrate how the State's best interest of the child standard is being misapplied by courts in parental termination proceedings because the court and child welfare agencies alike fail to understand that a parent's deporta tion, for immigrant families with mixed immigration status, may in fact cause serious harm to the child, as well as violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child's presumption that family unity is in the best interest of the child. 250 Generally speaking, a child should not be removed from a parent even if the parent is not documented unless there evidence that the parent is unable or unwilling to care for the child. For a child who has valid immigra tion status in the United States and undocumented parents, the U.S. govern ment should consider whether or not the deportation of the parent with or without the child would be in the child's best interest. In such cases immigra tion adjudicators should consider exercising prosecutorial discretion and al low the parent to remain in the United States. Preservation of the familial unit, when appropriate, is paramount. Despite an international mandate, as exemplified by the CRC, for a needs-based rights model to children's rights, U.S. immigration law has failed to incorporate these fundamental principles into its statutory frame work or its daily protocols and procedures. The following section recom mends a needs-based rights framework for children in immigration law that incorporates both the CRC' s framing principles and concomitant human rights obligations. Specifically, this section identifies discrete steps for the U.S. Congress to take in addressing significant structural gaps in the federal government's capacity to protect immigrant children's rights.
A. Non-discrimination Principle Applied to the INA' s Definition of Child
Consistent with the CRC's express principle of non-discrimination, the current Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) definition of "child" must be changed in order to accommodate both children who have parents and those who do not. Currently, under the INA a child is only legally considered a "child" if he or she is "an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age" and fits within one of six categories, each of which requires a distinct rela tionship with a parent, including birth in wedlock, adoption, a statutorily defined stepchild relationship, and what is referred to as "legitimation." 251 Therefore, any child falling outside of these categories is, by default, an adult for all intents and purposes under the INA. 252 Treating two children, who are similarly situated (e.g., both fleeing vio lence), differently based on arbitrary categories is undoubtedly discrimina tory in nature. 253 The child who fits within the INA definition finds safety, is afforded a path to relief as a derivative of the sponsor parent, and is given the opportunity of family unity; the child who does not fit within the INA definition finds none of these benefits and must "suffer the same harsh con 251 Thronson, supra note 15, at 991. See 8 U.S.C. § I IOl(b)(l)(A)-(F) (2012). 252 Thronson, supra note 15, at 997. 253 The Supreme Court's decision in Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), underscores further disparate treatment created by current U.S. immigra tion law. In Nguyen, the Supreme Court upheld the deportation of a man, who had lived the majority of his life in the United States being raised by his American father, because his father failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for unwed paternal transmission of citizenship. Id. at 70-71; see also Erin Chlopak, Mandatory Motherhood and Frustrated Fatherhood: The Supreme Court's Preservation of Gender Discrimination in American Citizenship Law, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 967, 969 (2002) . This result would have been completely different if Nguyen's mother, who was not a U.S. citizen and abandoned him in infancy, was a U.S. citizen because the statutory scheme of maternal transmission would have then made Nguyen an American citizen. Chlopak, supra note 253, at 969-70. Therefore, the statutory scheme led to a discrimi natory result in this situation as well, in that it treated similarly situated parents of American citizenship differently based on their gender. See also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445 (1998) (discussing the same statute at controversy in Nguyen and holding that "[t]he biologi cal differences between single men and single women provide a relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on children born in foreign lands").
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Rights for Immigrant Children sequences and limited procedural protections faced by adult immigrants." Unlike other areas of the law, U.S. immigration law still affords no legal distinction between children and adults when adjudicating potential forms of relief. Procedurally, there are no compulsory child-specific accommodations for immigrant children, as there are in family or juvenile court. Moreover, children are held to the same credibility and evidentiary burdens as adults.
Moreover, such outcomes are wholly contradictory to Congress's appar ent priority of promoting family unity under the INA, which is evidenced by numerous amendments added since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was enacted, such as "quota exempt permanent residence for children and parents of adult U.S. citizens" and "derivative status for the children of new permanent residents and nonimmigrant visa holders." 254 Accordingly, Congress should also extend the definition of "immediate relative" 255 out of the recognition that the family unit encompasses other integral members, such as siblings, grandparents, aunts and uncles, and cousins. 256 Currently, immigration law provides no avenue for these members to act as the child's sponsor. If the child is not a "child" for purposes of the INA, he or she is an adult, and therefore simply cannot derive status from these members of their family.
Instead of the INA specifying varying ages for various forms of immi gration relief and benefits, the INA's definition of child should be amended to read: "the term 'child' means a person under eighteen years of age." The age of majority, eighteen, mirrors the CRC's definition of a child. 257 While in some circumstances this change will result in individuals no longer being classified as children pursuant LO the INA (i.e., unmarried, born-in-wedlock persons between the ages of 18 and 21 ), this new standard would be consis tent with international definitions of a child. Moreover, aligning the defini tion of child throughout the INA, regardless of whether the child was born in or out of wedlock, is adopted, is a step-child, or is married, fully realizes the CRC's guiding principle of non-discrimination.
B. The CRC's Best Interest Standard Must Be Codified and
Operationalized in Federal Immigration law Article 3.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) pro vides that, "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administration authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a pri mary consideration." 258 The current immigration system does not-neither 2 s• Thronson, supra note 15, at 1009. 255 8 U.S.C. § 155l(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining immediate relatives). 256 Mzazki & Schoenholtz, supra note 154, at 654-55. 257 See CRC, supra note 114, at art. I ("For purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier."). 258 See id. at art. 3.
through statute nor regulation-incorporate the best interest principle, as re quired by the CRC, into the initial screening of children on arrival, the care and custody decisions thereafter, or the crucial decision of which avenues of relief to pursue. The child's need-rights model compels States to elevate the best inter ests of the child as a primary consideration, even when other policy goals, such as immigration control, are paramount. 259 Several changes are required for immigration law to truly assess and protect the best interests of immi grant children. First, Congress should enact a federal best interest standard to be interpreted and applied consistently throughout the INA. Second, it should establish an interagency "Child Protection Corps" to ensure that chil dren have access to trained child welfare specialists and that the process for applying for immigration relief is a child-centered approach.
Enacting a Federal Best Interest Standard
In order to ensure consistent decision making by immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals, which incorporates a child-sensitive approach to all adjudication decisions, Congress must first adopt a federal best interest standard. 260 A federal best interest standard must embody a child-centered approach, which places the "best interests" considerations and the child's right to express views and opinions, referred to as the right to "voice," at the heart of the decision making concerning children. 261 A fed eral best interest standard should also be a primary consideration in the treat ment of children in the immigration system. 262 The Young Center at the University of Chicago Law School, a nationally recognized organization specializing in protecting immigrant children's rights and needs, has pro posed model legislation for a federal best interest standard. This standard incorporates the CRC's core principles. Accordingly, a federal best interest standard in immigration law:
Shall consider, in the context of the child's age and maturity, the following factors: 6. The child's well-being, including the need of the child for edu cation and support related to child development. 7. The child's ethnic, religious, and cultural and linguistic background. 263 This best interest standard should not only be used to adjudicate immigration relief, but also should govern DHS's decisions pertaining to the screening and classification of minors, as well as the care and custody determinations of minors as detailed in the next subsection.
Operationalizing a Federal Best Interest Standard 264
To ensure that the Federal Best Interest Standard is fully operationalized within the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Congress-through legislation-should establish an interagency known as the "Child Protection Corps," comprised of specialized experts: "child protection officers" who possess both extensive child welfare training and a deep understanding of immigration law. Child protection officers would be deployed to the federal agencies who are either responsible for the care and custody of unaccompa nied minors or are charged with determining whether these children have a legal right to remain in the United States. Child protection officers would ensure that government officials are applying the best interests of the child principle 265 in determinations of care and custody, as well as providing long term protection and permanency.
a. Custody Determinations and Placement
In order to comply with Article 37(b) of the CRC, which dictates that the arrest and detention of children should only be used as a measure of last resort and should be for the shortest appropriate period of time, the U.S. needs child welfare experts to monitor and guide OHS and HHS regarding decisions about custody and placements. 266 267 Presently, ORR is obligated by law to place unaccompanied minors in the least restrictive setting possible. 268 ORR typically detains these children in ORR-operated detention centers un til the child is either released to the care of a parent or close family member ("sponsor"), or placed in HHS facilities that are licensed to house children when no sponsor is available. 269 As to the latter scenario, such placements include long-term foster care, extended-care group homes, and residential treatment centers for children in need of certain psychological or psychiatric services. 270 The Child Protection Corps' officers would help ensure that, while the children are in ORR custody, the best interest principle guides all accommo dations, including policies regarding visitation, recreation, education, medi cal treatment, and nutrition. Moreover, the Child Protection Corps would coordinate with ORR and NGOs that have expertise in identifying linguisti cally and culturally appropriate community resources, including mental health and integration services. These NGOs could provide such services even at the inundated surge shelters and transit centers.
b. Adjudication
As Article I immigration judges adjudicate potential relief for children that are either unaccompanied or applying as the principle applicant, statu tory and regulatory safeguards must be in place to ensure that the best inter ests of the child are paramount. Congress should require that all unaccompanied children, or children who are the principal applicant for re lief, that are placed in removal proceedings be afforded a government funded or pro bono attorney who is trained in representing unaccompanied children. Under current law while any noncitizen facing removal may be represented by counsel in removal proceedings, there is no right to govern ment-funded counsel. 271 In addition, the child would be assigned to a child advocate 272 (comparable to a state court best interests guardian ad !item) whose primary responsibility would be to assess, evaluate, and then advo cate for the best interests of the child. Working with both the child and the appointed child advocate, the appointed attorney would apply for immigra tion relief, including temporary humanitarian options. 27 3 In addition to Congress providing counsel for children faced with de portation, they should also require that all unaccompanied children, or chil dren as the principal applicant in removal proceedings, be assigned to a dedicated juvenile docket at the immigration court. Every jurisdiction would designate a day or a portion of day, depending on the numbers of cases in that jurisdiction, for all cases involving unaccompanied minors and cases in which the child is the primary applicant for relief. Every immigration court would maintain a dedicated juvenile docket with at least two dedicated im migration judges assigned to such docket. 274 These judges would receive sig nificant, uniform training from child protection officers in the Child Protection Corps on adjudicating children's cases, including child-specific relief and how evidentiary rules should be applied to children in these pro ceedings. Finally, every Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Trial Attorney unit would have an ICE trial attorney who specializes in immigrant children's cases and has been thoroughly trained on the best interest princi ple from child protection officers. These ICE attorneys would be educated on when and how to question children in removal proceedings and be in structed to exercise prosecutorial discretion in favor of not seeking deporta tion in deserving cases. Lastly, these attorneys would be encouraged to work with appointed counsel to find a solution for the child that is in the child's best interest.
C. Right to Life, Survival, and Development Requires Upholding Non-Refoulement
It is unquestionable that the worst fate a child that has escaped a place of danger, depravity, and violence faces is being forced to return to that place by those from whom they sought safety. At the very least, the United States must create a form of withholding of removal for a child who would face irreparable harm upon return to his or her country of origin. For exam ple, Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture 275 provides withholding or deferral of removal for an individual who is not eligible for refugee relief, but who nevertheless establishes that "it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal." 276 In fact, "the CRC, unlike the Convention Against Torture, does not require State perpetration for an action to be torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and thus the non-refoulement protection offered by the CRC is broader." 277 For immigrant children fleeing irreparable harm from their home country, there is an affirmative obligation on States, including the United States, to provide protection by not returning that child to his or her home. 278 This obligation can be met by amending the withholding of removal provision 279 in the Immigration and Nationality Act to include a provision for children facing irreparable harm upon return. An amendment to the INA should include at the very least the following language: NIED ALIEN CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (Apr. 22, 2008), available at http://www .justice.gov/eoir/press/08/UnaccompaniedAlienChildrenApr08.pdf, archived at http://perma .cc/YH2A-NURK (providing agency overview of unaccompanied minor adjudications). 275 287, 296 (2007) . 277 Farmer, supra note 144, at 41 (comparing CAT, supra note 275, at art. 3, with CRC, supra note 114, at art. 37). Spring 2015
Rights for Immigrant Children Section 24l(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is amended by inserting the following after 24l(b)(3):
(4) Restriction on removal to a country where a child would face irreparable harm IN GENERAL -Not withstanding paragraphs (I), (2), and (3), the Attorney General may not remove a child to a country if the Attor ney General decides that the child would face irreparable harm upon return to his or her home country by the government, indi viduals, or groups that the government is unable or unwilling to control.
As a highly respected and central member of the international commu nity, the United States must establish a non-derogable, non-discretionary policy that creates a strict non-refoulement policy for these children. This policy would be consistent with what is quickly becoming a jus cogens norm-a norm from which no derogation is permitted-across the interna tional community of non-refoulement in the refugee context. 280 Applying the emerging jus cogens non-refoulement norm to children fleeing harm would "enforce[ ] observance of the basic human rights that underlie refugee pro tection, because it fundamentally prevents [children] from being returned to situations where they would face violations of those rights." 281 In addition to establishing a statutory right to remain for a child that faces irreparable harm upon return, the process for assessing this claim must also be child-centered. Children who experience trauma often do not open up immediately. They often need time, in an appropriate setting, to express their true reasons for coming to the United States and should be interviewed by individuals with expertise and training in child welfare and development. Under the Child Protection Corps model, child protection officers would be imbedded at ICE to initially determine if the child is potentially in need of international protection, whether accompanied or unaccompanied. Child pro tection officers would make these determinations instead of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) or ICE officers whose primary training and job respon sibilities are in law enforcement. These trained specialists would know how to interview the child in a comprehensive, sensitive manner that takes into account the child's age, maturity, and other pertinent developmental factors. This would provide a more accurate understanding of their eligibility for relief from deportation, including withholding of removal. 28°F anner, supra note 122, at 22. 281 See id. at 22-24 (arguing that the drafters of the 195 I Convention on the Status of Refugees, who relied heavily on the guiding opinions of the States concerned, intended non refoulement to be a non-derogable norm and right).
relief is currently only temporary, it "recognizes children as actors who, based on their own actions and ambitions, may qualify for immigration status." 288 Finally, in cases where a child is the primary applicant for relief, his or her parents and siblings should be able to derive status if it is in the best interests of the child. Under current immigration law, there are two circum stances where parents and siblings may derive immigration status from a child. In 2000, when Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Vio lence Protection Act, 289 it created what is commonly known as the "U visa" and "T visa." Both the U and T visas include parents and siblings of the child among those eligible for derivative visas. 290 This option should be available for any child, who is the principal applicant for immigration relief, including asylum.
By expanding pathways for family unity and opportunities for children to petition for immigration relief as principal applicants, immigration law can uphold our nation's valuation of the family. Furthermore, such changes guarantee fuller participation for children, as rights holders, as envisioned by the CRC. CONCLUSION In sum, debates about the nature and the parameters of children's rights have had little bearing on the existing legal framework for immigrant chil dren. Currently, no children's needs-based rights model in immigration law exists. Unlike other areas of the law, U.S. immigration law still affords no legal distinction between children and adults when adjudicating potential forms of relief. Procedurally, there are no compulsory child-specific accom modations for immigrant children as there are in family or juvenile court. Moreover, children are held to the same credibility and evidentiary burdens as adults. 291 Children have no right to government-funded counsel; instead they must pay for the costs of representation. 292 Except in extremely narrow circumstances, they cannot petition to bring their parents and siblings as de rivatives. Overall, their child-specific needs and rights are disregarded and left unmet.
This Article concludes that international human rights law-specifi cally, the Convention on the Rights of the Child-articulates a workable, comprehensive framework of children's positive (or welfare) and liberal rights, and can and should be implemented in U.S. immigration law. Specifi cally, immigration law must at a minimum prohibit the return of a child to a country where that child would face irreparable harm; permit children when appropriate to petition for immigration relief on their own behalf; provide experts trained in child welfare and immigration law to assess the best inter ests of the child; and provide free legal counsel to children facing deporta tion. Not only are these minimal steps critical to fulfill the United States' obligations under international human rights Iaw, 293 but they are also neces sary to provide the space, tools, and means for an immigrant children needs based rights model to be realized. 291 Thronson, supra note 15, at 1000 (citing Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Through a Child's Eyes: Protecting the Most Vulnerable Asylum Seekers, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 757, 757 (June I, 1998)). 292 Shea, supra note 273, at 151-52. 293 FRYDMAN, supra note 212, at 37-55.
